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The changes on the EU gas market are likely to affect Europe’s relations with its natural gas 
suppliers who are facing increasing competition. Heading this list of producing countries is 
Russia. Gas relations between Russia and the EU are characterized by strong interdependence. 
But these relations are currently being hampered by serious lack of understanding, making it 
difficult for the two parties to reach agreement on a new energy partnership. The aim of this 
article is to analyse the effects of this new European gas context on Gazprom’s strategy and 
how the issues of energy security and cooperation between Russia and the EU will be affected 




Russia is by far the European Union’s most important gas partner. The country’s gas company 
Gazprom provides the EU with 40 per cent of its natural gas imports, which account for 57.6 
per cent of the company’s gas exports. However, despite the strategic importance of relations 
between the EU and Russia, serious lack of understanding between the parties is currently 
making it impossible for agreement to be reached on a new energy partnership. Until now, the 
EU has been pursuing its objectives of liberalizing the gas industry, creating a single market 
and ensuring supply security. At the same time, Russia, as the EU’s main supplier, has been 
seeking to consolidate its position and expand its outlets, encouraging Gazprom to acquire 
more assets downstream in the European gas chain.  
 
The considerable reduction in Europe’s gas demand in 2009, the EU’s adoption of the third 
energy package, which provides additional impetus to the opening up of the European market, 
and recent developments in the world market are upsetting the gas market order. All of these 
changes are likely to affect Europe’s relations with its natural gas suppliers, who are facing 
increasing competition. Heading this list of producing countries is Russia. So what effect is 
this having on Gazprom’s strategy with respect to the European market, a strategy thus far 
dominated by a policy of downstream integration and export market diversification? How will 
the issues of energy security and cooperation between Russia and the EU be affected by this 










































I. Gazprom’s response to EU gas market liberalization 
 
The liberalization of EU gas markets driven by the gas directives of 1998 and 2003, then by 
the third energy package of 2009, implies a major organizational and institutional 
transformation of the gas industry in the EU countries. The process involves de-integration of 
national monopolies along with third-party access (TPA) in segments of an industry where 
transmission/distribution operates as a natural monopoly. Liberalization will result in greater 
competition among suppliers, and more spot market sales and short-term transactions. It will 
also increase the exposure to “price risk” and “volume risk” of Europe’s gas suppliers. 
 
Gazprom is adopting a number of strategies to deal with this increasingly uncertain 
environment. The company intends to maintain its long-term contracts as a way of 
guaranteeing its sales to Europe. But it is also attempting to develop policies that will enable it 
to adapt to the changing situation, such as consolidating its outlets by gaining a foothold in the 
European gas market, increasing its export routes to Europe, and diversifying its export 
markets to Asia and the US. However, the various responses being developed by Gazprom in 
response to the changing European market require different time frames. The strategy of 
acquiring existing assets or creating subsidiaries in Europe will obviously take less time to 
implement than setting up competitive projects involving exports to Asia. Diversification can 
only take place in the medium to long term given that it will be necessary for Russia to 
develop the gas fields in eastern Siberia. 
 
I.1 Uncertainty concerning long-term contracts 
 
Under the former system, long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts were a way of sharing the 
risks related to prices and volumes between producers and importers (Boussena, 1999) and in 
doing so they helped stabilize relations between the parties. Until now, such contracts, with a 
few amendments, have generally resisted the upheavals of the European market and continue 
to provide a basis for most of the EU’s imports. But as the liberalization process intensifies, 
the incompatibility between the two approaches is becoming more evident. Today, one of the 
possible sources of friction between the EU and Gazprom (and probably other suppliers as 
well) is the possible re-examination of these long-term contracts or amendments to some of 
their clauses that are deemed to be incompatible with the flexibility needed for the operation 
of a single natural gas market (Chevalier and Percebois, 2007). Among the “questionable” 
clauses are those concerning the duration of contracts, the price indexation formula, and 
flexibility regarding minimum and maximum quantities the purchaser must take. Negotiations 
will probably take place with a view to modifying some of these clauses (with the 
introduction of a spot price in the indexation formula)
1 while others, such as the final 
destination clause, have already been removed. Even thought the debate is far from over in 
Europe (Hauteclocque and Glachant, 2009; Rious, 2009), the EU authorities appear to 
consider these TOP contracts to be contrary to the Union’s competition policy (EC, 2008; 
Percebois, 2008), seeing them as major barriers to the entry of potential new partners and 
believing that they inhibit development of the liquidity needed in the markets. The risk is that 
                                                 
1 In certain cases, components of formulas for pricing part of the gas supply will include market prices for 
electricity, or prices for coal, which can be a substitute for gas in electricity generation. In a few years time they 
could include spot prices in continental Europe, provided these markets are sufficiently liquid. Liberalization 










































1the markets will become divided, which is counter to the creation of a single market for gas, 
the second objective of EU energy policy (Talus, 2007). 
 
For Gazprom as for other external suppliers, long-term contracts are a factor in securing 
demand and consequently in securing the investment required upstream. The financial risk 
related to the enormous investment needed to develop new production zones is limited by the 
fact that TOP contracts guarantee outlets over the long term. Gazprom has frequently pointed 
out that the huge gas reserves in Yamal province can only be developed if it continues to sign 
long-term TOP contracts with European countries. Its primary goal is to try to maintain such 
long-term contracts in order to guarantee its sales in Europe. In fact it has had a certain degree 
of success, having concluded new TOP contracts with E.ON, ENI, GDF-Suez, Wintershall 
and OMV (cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Long-term contracts concluded by Gazprom with European partners between 
2005 and 2009 (new and renewed) 
 
Country   Company  Duration of contract  Quantities 
E.ON-Ruhrgas (1)  2011-2036 100  Gm
3 
E.ON-Ruhrgas  2020-2035 300  Gm
3 




WIEH 2014-2031  90  Gm
3 
Austria  OMV (2)  2012-2027  7.5 Gm
3/yr 
Bulgaria  Bulgargaz (3)  2011-2030  3 Gm
3/yr 
Denmark  Dong Energy (4)  2011-2031  1 Gm
3/yr 
Italy  ENI (5)  2017-2035  22 Gm
3/yr 
GDF-Suez (5)  2017-2030  12 Gm
3/yr  France 
GDF-Suez (6)  2010-2040  2.5 Gm
3/yr 
Poland  PGNiG 2009-2037  11  Gm
3/yr 
RWE Transgaz (7)  2014-2035  9 Gm
3/yr  Czech Republic 
Vemex (8)  2008-2012  0.55 Gm
3/yr 
WIEH 2012-2030  4.5  Gm
3/yr  Romania 
WIEH 2012-2030  4.5  Gm
3/yr 
Slovakia  SPP 20-year  contract  6.5  Gm
3/yr 
Notes: (1) incumbent operator and via NordStream pipeline; (2) incumbent operator, 25 per cent marketed by 
Centrex and GWh controlled by Russian interests; (3) incumbent operator; (4) via NordStream pipeline; (5) 
incumbent operator. ENI has agreed that Gazprom can sell 3 Gm
3/yr directly on the Italian market. The 
agreements signed are aimed at defining a partnership based on asset swaps with Gazprom: a 10 per cent stake in 
ENIPower in exchange for shares in a gas field, and the creation of a joint marketing company in exchange for a 
stake in a gas field; (6) incumbent operator and via NordStream pipeline; (7) incumbent operator; (8) Vemex, 
marketing company in which Gazprom has a 33 per cent share.  
Sources: Tonjes, De Jong (2007); Finon, Locatelli (2006); “Gazprom starts to compete against its own long-term 
contracted supplies in the Czech downstream market”, Gas Matters, Nov-Dec 2007, pp. 24-25; Argus FSU 
Energy, 5 March 2010. 
 
I.2 Gazprom – adapting through downstream integration 
 
To consolidate and better develop its exports, a natural gas supplier may be tempted to seek 
greater participation in downstream activities, penetrating at least as far as the wholesale trade 
sector. By acquiring assets in transmission and distribution companies, and even in gas-
consuming industries (such as electricity generation), producers have the opportunity to sell 
their resources without having to face competition on wholesale markets (Eikeland, 2007). 
Downstream integration also provides producers with the opportunity to increase their profits 
by capturing the profit margins of middlemen in the various downstream segments. At least, 










































Gazprom’s policy of acquiring assets abroad (in regions to which it exports), which it has 
been doing since the end of the 1980s, falls within this type of strategy, the aim of which is to 
gain as much access as possible to end-consumers. Gazprom has stated its ambition to obtain 
a 10 per cent direct share of the French and UK markets by 2010 and 20 per cent by 2015. It 
has expressed similar goals with respect to Italy and the Czech Republic. The company started 
by setting up joint ventures in transmission, marketing and trading with incumbent operators 
in Europe. It then went on to create marketing subsidiaries in certain European countries 
and/or to acquire minority or majority stakes in local companies. This more recent method of 
penetrating markets is still not very widespread, although acquisitions have already be made 
in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Hungary, Austria and in particular the 
Baltic states (Locatelli, 2008).  
 
Box 2: Gazprom’s main Joint ventures, acquisitions among its European Union partners 
and its main subsidiaries in the EU (end of 2009) 
 
Countries Company 
Austria  Gazprom will have right to sell directly to customers through subsidiary 
GWH and Centrex (25% held by Gazprom) 
GWH : JV with OMV, marketing et trading  
Germany  Wingas : JV with Wintershall, Transportation and sales 
WIEH : JV with Wintershall, Sales, marketing and storage  
WIEE : JV with Wintershall, sales of Russian gas to Central and South 
European countries 
Finland  Gasum : JV with Fortum and E. ON, distribution 
North Transgas OY : JV with Forum ; transportation (gas pipeline) 
 
France 
Gazprom Marketing and Trading France SAS, Gazprom’s subsidiary to sell 
gas directly to french consumers 
Fragas : JV with GDF-Suez, distribution et trading 
Hungary  Acquisition of share in E.ON Foldag Storage and E.ON Foldaz and in 
regional gas and electricity suppliers as part of a deal with E.ON concerning 
its holdings in MOL 
Panrusgaz : JV with Mol, Marketing and distribution 
Italy  Possibility of acquisition of 10% stake in ENIpower with direct sales of gas 
for electricity production 
Poland  EuroPolGaz  : JV with PGNiG, Transportation (Yamal-Europe pipeline in 
Poland) 
Czech Rep  Vemex  : JV, Gazprom is a shareholder by the mean of Centrex Energy, 
Trading of Russian gas 
Romania  Winrom gas SA : JV WIEE-Distrigas, implication of Gazprom by the mean 
of WIEE, sales of gas  
Acquisition of share in gas distributor Pennine Natural Gas (PNG)  
Acquisition of gas distribution company NGSS (Natural Gas Shipping 
Services) 
United Kingdom 
Gazprom Marketing and Trading, Gazprom subsidiary enabling Gazprom to 
sell Russian gas directly in the UK 
Switzerland  WIEE : JV with Wintershall, marketing 
Estonia  Acquisition of share (37.5%) in marketing and transmission company Eesti 
Gaas 
Latvia  Acquisition of share (34%) in marketing and distribution company Latvijas 
Gaze 




Acquisition of share (37%) in marketing and transmission company Lietuvos 
Dujos 










































-  the EU’s response: the third energy package 
 
Some in the EU consider Gazprom’s policy of seeking footholds downstream to be a threat to 
Europe’s energy security, not least because the Russian State holds a major stake (51 per cent) 
in Gazprom’s capital
2. These parties are trying to discourage this practice in the EU by 
unbundling ownership of the gas chain or introducing the third country clause.  
 
Discussions on the third energy package have highlighted a certain number of stumbling 
blocks between the EU and Gazprom. They concern the effect on producers of ownership 
unbundling imposed by the EU as part of gas industry de-integration. With unbundling, the 
various segments of the gas chain are separated in terms of their legal structure and for 
accounting purposes in order to avoid vertical integration, which is considered to be a barrier 
to the entry of new players. Unbundling first of all affects European gas companies and 
especially incumbent operators  that are vertically integrated from production through to 
distribution. But it can also affect companies in producing countries, getting in the way of 
their strategies to enter the downstream sector. Although a final compromise has been 
reached, albeit less ambitious than the initial proposals of the European Commission
3, a 
number of ambiguities still remain. It can be considered that the rules adopted in the third 
energy package mean that a producer and supplier such as Russia cannot also, at the same 
time, be a Transmission System Operator (TSO) in a member state (Willems et al, 2010).  
 
The controversy has been intensified because of the third country clause, also known as the 
“anti-Gazprom clause”. Under its provisions, if non-EU energy companies wish to operate in 
the EU, they must demonstrate that they do not pose any threat to EU energy security. The 
clause could appear as a serious barrier to potential foreign investment in the European energy 
sector. 
 
I.3 Increasing export capacities 
 
With its plan to construct new gas pipelines to Europe, Russia is expecting to ensure exports 
of the order of 200 Gm
3 to this zone by 2030. Two main supply routes are concerned: the 
Nord Stream, with a total capacity of 55 Gm
3 and the South Stream, with a capacity of 
63 Gm
3 (Box 1). The Nord Stream pipeline project is well under way and the first line should 
be operational by the end of 2011. The South Stream project is still in the negotiation stage. 
These two export routes, in particular the Nord Stream, are a vital part of Russia’s strategy to 
secure its exports to the European markets, particularly following the two gas disputes with 
Ukraine and more recently with Belarus. Passing under the Baltic sea, the Nord Stream is the 
first gas pipeline to link Russia with the natural gas markets of Western Europe. In the present 
context where there is a slump in demand from Europe, this pipeline may act as a partial 
substitute for exports that would otherwise be shipped via Ukraine. In this case, the project 
takes on a political as well as an economic flavour. Russia’s objectives with the South Stream 
are much broader. While Russia is clearly aiming to diversify its export routes and expand its 
                                                 
2 The UK government showed strong opposition to Gazprom’s ambitions – supposed or real – to buy shares in 
British company Centrica. 
 
3 Each country may choose to opt either for ownership unbundling or for a structural organization in which an 










































1sales, it is also trying to counter the Nabucco pipeline (Caspian gas), a project backed by the 
EU which sees it as a way of reducing its dependence on Russian gas. 
 




A 1,220 km gas pipeline between Russia (Vyborg) and Germany (Greifswald) under the Baltic sea. 
The first line, with a capacity of 27.5 Gm
3 should become operational in October 2011 and the second, 
with a capacity of 55 Gm
3, by the end of 2012.  
The estimated total cost of the two pipelines is 8.8 billion euros. 
The consortium is composed of Gazprom (51%), E.ON (15.5%), Wintershall (15.5%), GDF-Suez 
(9%) and Gasunie (9%). Gazprom has already signed long-term contracts for delivery of 20 Gm
3 via 
the Nord Stream. 
Initially, this pipeline was to be supplied with gas from the Shtokman field. However, for the first 
phase, only gas fields in western Siberia will be concerned. 
 
South Stream 
Gas pipeline between Russia and Central and Southern Europe via the Black Sea. This project is still 
in its early stages. The planned route will enable Russian gas to be delivered to Bulgaria. From there, 
the pipeline will be divided into two branches, one to Italy via Greece and the other to Austria via 
Slovenia, Hungary and Serbia. 
The envisaged capacity is 63 Gm
3/yr, in two pipelines, the first of which will have a capacity of 
31.5Gm
3/yr. 
The pipeline is expected to be on-stream in 2015. 
The consortium is composed of Gazprom (51%) and ENI (49%). EDF could join the consortium with 
a 20% stake. 
 
I.4 Transcontinental competition between the major import markets 
 
Gazprom’s policy of diversifying its markets is a way of responding to what it feels is 
Russia’s over-dependence on the European market. The EU is currently its most profitable 
market, in particular compared with its domestic market (low government-regulated prices) 
and other CIS countries, where prices are considerably lower than those contracted with EU 
partners (Locatelli, op. cit.). This policy was especially encouraged at the beginning of the 
2000s at a time when the Russian state was regaining control of the sector and when there was 
much talk about scarcity of resources in the long term and about competition between the 
major importing countries for access to hydrocarbon resources. The countries particularly 
concerned by this strategy of seeking alternative markets are Japan, China, South Korea, Asia 
in general, and also the US. For example, the Shtokman offshore field (Barents sea), which 
could have been developed with Europe in mind, might also be developed to a large extent to 
supply LNG to the US market. Pipeline projects to export gas to China could be supplied by 
reserves in eastern Siberia, which are a considerable distance from the European market (cf. 
Box 2). The gas fields in question are those in Kovykta (Irkoutsk region), Talakan and 
Chayandinskoye (Sakha Republic). This latter field could supply the projected 
Chayandinskoye-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline
4. Certain reserves in western Siberia 
being developed as part of the Altaï project could also be devoted to supplying China. By 
announcing this strategy Russia is suggesting that the European and Asian markets will be 
facing competition, whereas in reality, so long as there is no real worldwide gas market, and 
                                                 










































1in view of transmission costs and prices, these reserves are relatively captive and can only be 
profitable in one of the two destinations. But if Russia succeeds in developing its Asian 
markets, it will obviously be better placed to exert influence on natural gas price formation at 
the international level (Boussena and Locatelli, 2005). 
 
Box 2: Gazprom’s projects for export routes to China   
Three competing projects 
 
- Chayandinskoye-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok-China pipeline from the Chayandinskoye gas field: over 
2,000 km in length and with a capacity of 30 Gm
3/yr.  
 
- Altaï project: Urengoi-Samotlor (western Siberia)-Novosibirsk-China: 2,800 km. 
The agreement signed in 2006 between Gazprom and CNPC concerns 30 Gm
3 of exports to China. 
This project, which was updated in 2010, could be developed on a “loans for gas” basis, already tested 
by Russia with China for oil.  
 
- Route parallel to the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline from Kovykta: 3,000 km with a capacity 
of 30 Gm
3. Of the projects examined, the Kovykta gas field has the largest reserves.  
 
- Also further projects to export LNG from Sakhalin I, consortium headed by ExxonMobil: 
preliminary export agreement signed in 2006 with CNPC. 
 
 
II. Recent developments: new challenges for Gazprom 
 
While over the last few years we have witnessed a notable rise in gas delivery capacity to 
Europe from the Middle East, North Africa and Nigeria, the economic crisis that started in 
2008 has led to considerable reductions in gas demand in most of the large EU states, which 
are the main importers of Russian gas (cf. table 3). Furthermore, the higher than expected 
growth in unconventional gas production in the United States seems to be creating a different 
situation from that of the early 2000s. In fact, while it is hoped that gas demand might rise 
again in the short to medium term thanks to renewed economic growth, the US market 
appears set to remain self-sufficient in the long term. In this case, large volumes of LNG that 
were originally destined for this market will most likely be redirected to Asia, where demand 
is still rising, and to Europe where these volumes are already starting to have an impact on 
prices. So a situation where expected pressure on future supply was leading to calls for greater 
investment in gas projects, notably from the EU, has given way to a market where supply is 
abundant and where buyers will most likely have an even stronger influence on prices.  
 
Table 3: Gas demand of some European countries, 2008 versus 2009 
 
BCM  2008 2009 2009/2008    BCM  2008 2009 2009/2008   
Germany  98,0  92,6  -  5.5%  Irland  5,2 5,0 -  3.8% 
Austria  8,7  8,8  -  1.2%  Italy 84,9 78,1 -  8.0% 
Spain  38,2 33,9 -  11.3%  Hungary  13,1 11,3 -  13.7% 
France  46,1  44,5  -  3.5%    Slovakia  6,3 6,1 -  3.2% 
Greece 4,2  3,5  -  16.7%  UK  99,0 90,8 -  9.0% 
Source : IEA (2010). 
 
This unexpected rise in delivery capacity to these two regions that import significant volumes 
of gas is bound to have an effect on Europe’s suppliers, and thus principally on Russia. 









































1reduced demand may in the medium term exacerbate overcapacity. With the prospect of gas 
markets remaining in oversupply, it is reasonable to assume that buyers now have the upper 
hand, leaving Gazprom with less room to manoeuvre. 
 
What can Russia do to reduce the negative effects of overcapacity on its export revenues? It 
could defend its prices by consulting with other producers through the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum or attempt to keep its market shares in Western Europe. The first option 
could not provide a solution in the short term. In the second case, it would mean allowing 
Gazprom to agree to certain demands from its clients to revise contractual conditions. To 
avoid having to do this, Russia is considering other possible courses of action aimed in 
particular at limiting production growth or developing new export markets. 
 
II.1 Revising its export investment programme  
 
In the medium term, one possibility might be for Gazprom to revise its investment programme 
in order to limit growth in its gas production. Between 2002 and 2008, Gazprom received 
frequent criticism from within the EU for not investing sufficiently in order to stem the 
decline of those reserves already on-stream and for not investing in new projects. The 
company’s ability to respect its long-term commitments was often called into question. This 
view, developed among others by V. Milov
5 (and often reiterated by the IEA), had influenced 
discussions between the two parties. In the new context, this no longer applies.  
The economic and financial crisis has led to a drastic drop in gas consumption in the EU and 
the CIS countries, and as a result Gazprom’s exports fell by around 21 per cent in 2009. Not 
including those to the CIS
6, Russia’s exports amounted to 140.6 Gm
3 in 2009 compared with 
158.8 Gm
3 in 2008. Adjustments on the Russian domestic market were also significant 
because of the slowdown in the country’s economic growth. These two trends resulted in a 16 
per cent drop in Russian gas output in 2009 and a readjustment of Gazprom’s production 
scenarios up to 2012. The company predicts output for 2012 of the order of 543 Gm
3, which is 
still lower than in 2008 (cf. Table 4). It will not be until 2013 that production (567 Gm
3) will 
be comparable to the level initially forecast for 2010. Revised estimates for 2010 in particular 
are considerably lower (down by 30 Gm
3). 
 
Table 4: Gas production forecasts for Russia 
 
BCM 2008  2010  2011  2012 
Gazprom (figures from Gazprom) 
Previous estimates  549  567  570   
Estimates 2009  549  507  510  533 
Estimates 2010  549  519  529  543 
Total Russian production (figures from Ministry of Economic Development) 
Previous estimates  664  647  660  675 
New estimates  664  623  630  649 
Source: « Gazprom upgrades output forecast ».- FSUE Argus, 11 juin 2010. 
 
Russia is therefore no longer compelled – at least in the short term– to invest massively in 
renewing its gas fields and infrastructure in order to meet its contractual commitments and 
                                                 
5 V. Milov forecast a gas deficit for Russia of 132 Gm
3 in 2010 (Milov, 2005), which tended to confirm the study 
by the Centre For European Policy Studies, which predicted a figure of 126 Gm
3 for 2010 (Riley, 2006). 
 
6 Gazprom’s exports to the CIS rose to 67.6 Gm
3 in 2009 compared with 95.6 Gm










































1domestic market needs. Gazprom has revised its investment programme profoundly, in 
particular delaying production of the Bovanenko field (Yamal province), initially envisaged 
for 2011, until the end of 2012. Prospects of developing the Shtokman field appear much less 
certain in the middle term (Stern, 2009). Development of this gas field is directly linked to 
Russia’s ambitions to export LNG to the US. But given the current situation in the US where 
natural gas spot prices are less than 5$/Mbtu, LNG exports would not be profitable. It 
therefore seems unlikely that that this gas field will go on stream before 2016
7.  
 
II.2 Speeding up diversification into the Asian market 
 
Apart from supplying Japan and South Korea with LNG from the Sakhalin gas field, the only 
medium-term option for greater diversification (at least that can be justified economically) is 
the Asian market, and more specifically China. Even though certain constraints remain – lack 
of agreement on price indexation formulas used for long-term contracts
8, the size of the 
infrastructures to be created and thus the considerable financial commitments
9 – the changes 
taking place on the European gas market could persuade Gazprom to speed up its plans for 
diversification into the Asian market. These competing projects show that the Russian state 
and Gazprom have not defined a coherent policy.  
Gazprom, which is bound by profitability constraints and must also develop natural gas 
consumption in the Russian Far-Eastern region, seems to favour the projects to build pipelines 
from fields in eastern Siberia and in particular from the Chayandinskoye field close to China’s 
eastern border. However, it is unlikely that this field will be developed before 2016, and 
probably even later
10. Resumption of negotiations between Gazprom and the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) on the Altaï project, a pipeline fed by gas reserves in western 
Siberia, would seem to suggest that some members of the Russian government (in particular I. 
Sechin
11) would like to see gas relations between Russia and China develop more rapidly, 
with deliveries of 30 BCM starting in 2015
12.  
 
However, in the short term at least, Asia can only be a complementary export destination and 
will not be competing with the EU for gas exports. The volumes concerned are between 50 
                                                 
7 “Off the drawing board”, Argus FSUE, 16 April 2010. 
 
8 The Chinese government wants to include coal prices on the Chinese market in the indexation formula used in 
any long-term contracts concluded with Russia, rather than just oil prices. Since China’s domestic coal prices are 
very low, this would lower the price of natural gas exports from Russia. Although its domestic prices have 
increased significantly over the last few years, China cannot envisage paying import prices comparable to those 
practised on European markets. ‘Russia misleads on China gas talks’ Argus FSU Energy, 23 November 2007.  
 
9 In the three potential production zones in eastern Siberia, the Republic of Sakha, and the Irkutsk and 
Krasnoyarsk regions, reserves are estimated at between 3.7 and 5.3 Tm
3 (proven) and over 50 Tm
3 (potential). 
Their development, along with the creation of long-distance gas pipelines, would however require considerable 
financial commitments. A number of projects are being envisaged. The Kovykta and Chayandinskoye fields 
could supply the Sakha-Yakoutie-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok pipeline. But these fields are not expected to go into 
production before 2017. From 2014, this pipeline could be fed by the Sakhalin 1 gas field. 
 
10 “West Siberia-China link back on the agenda”, Argus FSUE, 30 July 2010. 
 
11 I. Sechin is Deputy Prime Minister in charge of energy questions. He is also chairman of the Board of 
Directors of oil company Rosneft, an important point to note given Rosneft’s gas objectives in Asia. 
 
12 “China ponders Russian gas”.- Petroleum Argus, 23 Aug. 2010 ; “Russian firms sign China deals” Petroleum 











































3 compared with 157 Gm
3 for Europe in 2008 (before the crisis)
13. This question of 
diversification and of opening up new markets for Russian gas exports – especially in light of 
the development of Russian-Chinese relations – will be a key factor in relations between 
Europe and Russia
14. Moreover, apart from where the Sakhalin production units are 
concerned, Gazprom’s strategy of diversifying through the LNG option, in particular by 
exporting to the US market, appears to be compromised at least for the short-to-medium 
term
15. As we underlined, the profitability conditions do not seem to be in place to enable 
Russia to envisage exporting massive volumes of LNG. 
 
II.3 Defending its market shares in Europe 
 
The changes that have been taking place in the European gas market could call into question 
Gazprom’s stance with regard to its contractual conditions, and at the very least may force the 
company to agree to certain amendments, including renegotiating long-term contracts in order 
to add greater flexibility and preserve its market shares
16. As is the case for all gas producers, 
the company must find a new balance between prices and volumes.  
 
Two issues are at stake in the negotiations between Gazprom and European gas companies 
concerning changes to long-term contracts. First, given the substantial difference between the 
two price categories, the gas company is called to take spot price indices on the European 
market into account when formulating contract prices. In fact, whereas prices in TOP 
contracts have generally followed the evolution of the price of crude or petroleum products, to 
which they are indexed, spot prices of natural gas and LNG have collapsed due to the 
oversupply of gas in a gas-gas competition on the spot markets. Consequently, there is now a 
substantial difference between spot market prices and long-term contract prices
17. Even 
though the volumes sold on the free market are far smaller than those sold in long-term 
contracts, this imbalance – if it persists – is likely to pose problems for the various parties, 
particularly on the wholesale market which is developing rapidly. It will also be necessary to 
renegotiate the minimum quantities to be taken under the terms of the TOP contracts in light 
of the reduction in demand on the European markets. 
 
A certain number of European gas companies, including E.ON, Wintershall (through its 
subsidiary Wingas), ENI and GDF-SUEZ have been negotiating with Gazprom to have their 
                                                 
13 The figure of 50 Gm
3 was announced by S. Komlev. “Interview: Sergei Komlev, Gazprom Head of Contract 
Structuring and Price Formation”, Gas Matters, March 2010, pp. 17-19. The figure of 70 Gm
3 was also given by 
Gazprom following the agreement concluded with CNPC in 2009. ‘Russia’s Gas Plan New Routes, allies and 
Markets’, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 19 April 2010. 
 
14 As underlined by T. Gomart (2010), Russia often uses the Chinese option to obtain concessions from western 
partners. 
 
15 “Gazprom Price Stance Weakens As LNG Gains”, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, XLIX (10), 8 March 2010. 
 
16 In Europe there is a considerable gap between natural gas prices on spot markets and the oil-indexed prices in 
long-term contracts. Between August 2008 and November 2009, spot prices were on average about 50% lower 
than prices indexed to crude and petroleum product prices in TOP contracts in Europe and Asia. European gas 
companies have therefore tended to buy on spot markets, sometimes even failing to take the minimum quantities 
agreed upon in their long-term contracts. 
 
17 Between August 2008 and November 2009, spot prices were on average around 50% lower than gas prices 










































1contracts amended and according to the specialized press the German companies (E.ON, 
Wintershall, Wingas and WIEH) have obtained concrete results with respect to both prices 
and volumes, although details of these supposed agreements are not known
18 and have not 
been confirmed by Gazprom. Even if Gazprom makes such changes to only a small number of 
its contracts, for a limited period of time and for only part of the exported volumes, the 
introduction of spot prices in the price formula represents a marked change in its strategy. The 
company has always staunchly defended long-term contracts and oil-indexed prices (Finon 
and Locatelli, 2006), and it is continuing to do so despite the current adjustments
19. 
 
II.4 Developing cooperation with other exporting countries? 
 
This new – and more competitive – gas market configuration raises once again the question as 
to the viability of the project to create a “gas OPEC”, an organization promoted by a number 
of Europe’s major suppliers grouped together in a gas forum. Certain countries have been 
particularly keen to develop a coordinated policy for gas production in order to limit output 
and bolster prices
20. The flexibility that has been introduced into contracts by certain 
producers shows that coordination of efforts and cohesion within the gas exporters forum is 
far from being achieved. However, flexibility in long-term contracts, and even their partial 
replacement by short-term contracts, may open the way to coordinated actions from producers 
on the spot markets in order to bolster prices
21, an impossible scenario in the context of long-
term contracts. For the specialized press
22, producers had started to coordinate their policies 
(sales have been falling since May 2010) and concomitantly spot prices in Europe, to a certain 
extent, have been adjusted.  
 
III. Security in gas relations between Russia and the EU 
 
In addition to all the economic and legal issues concerning gas trading, in the last few years 
questions of security have also come to the fore. Relations and negotiations between the EU 
and Russia are largely coloured by these questions, which essentially concern two central 
contrasting notions – that of supply security, a concern voiced by the EU, and that of demand 
security raised by Russia, following in the footsteps of OPEC for oil. 
 
III.1 Security of supply versus security of demand 
 
                                                 
18 ‘Gazprom amends E.ON contract’ Argus, FSUE, 29 January 2010; ‘Gazprom ‘defines Take or Pay’, Argus 
FSUE, 13 November 2009. According to Argus, amendments to the long-term contract concluded with E. ON 
will remain in force until 2013 and will allow the German company to purchase 3.2 Gm
3 of gas per year from 
Gazprom at prices linked to spot market prices. This volume represents around 16% of the maximum volume 
specified in the long-term contract. ‘New German contracts take force’ Argus FSUE, 21 May 2010. 
 
19 A. Medvedev, director of Gazprom Export, was very clear on this point: Take or Pay (ToP) clauses are 
“unshakable and intouchable”. “Gazprom hits a crossroads with sales outlook in flux”, Gas Matters, July-Aug. 
2010. 
 
20 ‘First gas OPEC meeting” EU Energy, 231, 23 April 2010. 
 
21 “Gas cartel looms”.- Energy Economist, 342, April 2010. 
 
22 “La Russie et le Qatar ont considérablement réduit l’ampleur du surplus de gaz sur le marché international”, 










































1Supply security in a context of gas market liberalization has become a central theme in EU 
energy policy, along with competitivity and sustainable development (EC, op. cit.). Over the 
last few years, it has been centered more specifically on the so-called Russian risk. Gazprom’s 
investment strategy and delays in developing new production capacity, along with the 
different transit disputes with Ukraine, have brought the issue of the reliability of natural gas 
supplies from Russia to the fore. In this context, the nature of gas relations with Russia has 
been one of the most highly debated questions in the EU, although no agreement on a joint 
European position seems to have been reached (Cameron, 2010). The divergences between 
member states more or less reflect their extremely variable levels of dependence on Russian 
gas (cf. Table 5). Despite the sometimes deeply contrasting views among the EU states about 
Europe’s gas policy towards Russia, the prevailing tendency seems to be to give priority to 
gas security since this point still remains a central aspect of Europe’s position. 
 
Table 5: Dependence of some EU countries on gas imports from Russia, in % 
 
Germany Austria Bulgaria Estonia Finland  France  Greece  Italy 
43.6  71.6  100.0 100.0 100.0  22.0  67.3  29.0 
Lithuania Poland Czech  Rep  Romania UK Belgium  Spain  Portugal 
100.0 80.0  77.0  77.8  0  (1)  0 0 0 
Note (1): Gazprom conducted some spot sales on the UK market from time to time. 
Sources: Gazprom, Report 2009, Moscow; BP Energy statistical review, 2009. 
 
In contrast to these concerns about supply security, Russia has its own preoccupations about 
the security of its markets, particularly if it makes the heavy investments needed to develop 
new gas fields. EU market liberalization policy and climate policy are creating a certain 
amount of uncertainty over how much gas each of Europe’s suppliers, and Russia in 
particular, will be asked to deliver.  
Paradoxically, in the present context of oversupply, which puts natural gas sellers at a 
disadvantage, Russia’s position concerning the security of its markets in the long term takes 
on greater importance than in the past when it was used as a strictly political counter-
argument.  
 
III.2 Access to resources: a strategic objective of the Energy Charter  
 
The absence of any clear EU-wide policy with respect to Russia has led to the development of 
bilateral relations with Gazprom and Russia based on competition rules developed within the 
EU. Thus, as well as increasing the number of suppliers and ensuring the security of import 
routes, “supply security” in the eyes of the EU means, most importantly, gaining access for its 
gas companies to the hydrocarbon resources of producing countries. The Energy Charter is 
the crystallization of a European policy aimed principally at defining a multilateral investment 
treaty that will guarantee investment upstream in the oil and gas sectors. 
 
The Energy Charter, the first multilateral treaty designed to provide a legal framework for 
cooperation in energy matters, establishes series of rules governing trade, transit and 
investment aimed at liberalizing investments and energy flows. The Charter defines an 
investment framework that can guarantee international investment and also ensure non-
discriminatory conditions for foreign investors (incorporation of certain WTO clauses, such as 
the most-favoured-nation clause or the national treatment clause, see Haghighi, 2007). The 
principle of state sovereignty over natural resources is not as such called into question by the 
Charter. However, the rules pertaining to non-discrimination are not without repercussions. 









































1multilateral investment framework. Similarly, implicit in the transit protocol
23 is Gazprom’s 
obligation to provide third parties with access to its pipeline networks
24, since it establishes 
the principle of “freedom of transit”. This is an important question for the EU in its strategy to 
diversify its supply sources and promote competition. Potentially, this principle of freedom of 
transit could concern the transmission of gas from Central Asia to Europe via Russia. 
 
Security aspects such as uninterrupted supply and the reliability of transit routes will probably 
become less of a problem with time and as geopolitical relations between the EU and Russia 
improve. But, Europe’s vision of free to access to resources, promoted in the Energy Charter, 
may well remain problematic given the hydrocarbon development model that Russia is 
planning to implement (Konoplyanik and Wälde, 2006). According to the Russian 
government, the model for organizing the hydrocarbon industries and structuring the markets 
that the Charter implies means that it is in profound contradiction with the interests of energy 
producers (Konoplyanik, 2010). Russia is now tending to promote organizational 
arrangements that are more in keeping with its institutional environment
25. The authorities are 
doing this by imposing tighter, more restricted control over access to the country’s 
hydrocarbon resources. This development is undoubtedly in the spirit of oil nationalism that 
started to emerge from 2000 onwards (Stevens, 2008). But more importantly the state is 
attempting to redefine economic incentives for oil companies to ensure that the long-term 
management objectives for its non-renewable resources are taken into account. This vision is 
clearly incompatible with the principles set forth in the Charter. 
 
III.3 V. Medvedev’s underlying response: upstream assets in exchange for downstream 
assets  
 
The method of asset swapping promoted by the Russian government is the product of a state-
based approach that gives preference to allowing access to its resources through bilateral 
relations between gas companies – but nevertheless with the support, and even the 
involvement, of the states. This approach, which will help Gazprom gain a stronger foothold 
in the downstream segments in Europe, stems from an industrial logic that is different from 
the market approach promoted by the EU which is based on a vision of competition and 
multilateral arrangements. Indeed, Russia seems increasingly determined to make access to its 
hydrocarbon resources conditional on it being able to acquire assets downstream in importing 
countries (cf. Box 3). The notion of reciprocity (Belyi, 2009) and special bilateral relations 
would seem to be the cornerstone of Russia’s hydrocarbons strategy. This approach is 
consistent with the objective of seeking maximum downstream integration in energy 
importing countries. 
                                                 
23 The Energy Charter transit protocol (2000) specifies the conditions of access to pipelines. It defines principles 
for determining transit tariffs, available capacity and unauthorized taking during transit. 
 
24 However, the protocol does not contain rules regarding TPA. Other disagreements on transit between the EU 
and Russia concern in particular the principles of transit tariff determination, use of available transit capacity and 
the “Right of first refusal” (where the duration of the supply contract is longer than the duration of the transit 
contract). For more information cf. Haghighi, 2007. 
 
25 According to neo-institutional analysis, the institutional environment has a decisive effect on the relative 













































Box 3: Gazprom-BASF agreement of 2009 
 
The agreement between Gazprom and BASF covers the entire gas chain, including exploration and 
production activities (in Russia), and transmission and distribution activities (in Germany and certain 
other European countries). Under the terms of the contract, Wintershall (subsidiary of BASF) receives 
a 25% stake minus one share in the Russian company Severneftegazprom which is developing the 
Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field (expected production capacity of 25 Gm
3 in 2009)
26. In exchange, 
Gazprom will increase its share in Wingas from 35 to 50% minus one share. A 50/50 joint venture 




Quite apart from these considerations, the position of the Russian government is that it must 
find an alternative to the Energy Charter. This will no doubt involve defining a new legal 
basis (and new standards) for dialogue between Russia and the EU that will better take into 
account the interests of the producing countries. In April 2009, President Medvedev proposed 
an alternative to the Charter in a document entitled “Conceptual Approach to the New Legal 
Framework for Energy Cooperation”
28. This document clearly reaffirms a number of the 
elements that structure current energy policy in Russia, more specifically state sovereignty 
over natural resources, asset swapping, the need to take into account demand aspects in 
discussing questions of supply security and to redefine relations between transit countries and 
the producing countries (Box 4). For the moment, this document is no more than a statement 
of main principles and objectives and does not propose any rules or standards. Nevertheless, it 
is an indication of a more global approach from Russia, which, according to T. Gomart 




Box 4: Some of the main principles of the Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework 
for Energy Cooperation  
 
The basic principles 
- Mutual responsibility of energy consuming and supplying countries, as well as transit states, in 
ensuring global energy security; 
- Security of supply and security of demand are key aspects of global energy security; 
- Unconditional state sovereignty over national energy resources; 
- Non-discriminatory access to international energy markets, which should be open and competitive; 
- Possibility of non-discriminatory investment in all segments of energy chain; 
- Promotion of mutual exchange of assets; 
- Non-discriminatory access to energy technologies; 
- Promotion of infrastructure projects of great importance for global and regional energy security; 
                                                 
26 Wintershall is also involved in developing a gas field in western Siberia, near Urengoy, through its joint 
venture with Gazprom Achimgaz. 
 
27 Similarly, in June 2009, French oil company Total acquired a 49% stake in a Novatek-owned unit in charge of 
developing a gas field in Yamal province. In exchange, Total sold a large part of its stake in a Dutch refinery to 
the Russian oil company Lukoil. 
 










































1- Coordination of energy policies, principles for regulation in production, transit, consumption, new 
infrastructure development, all essential for global energy security; 
- Creation of warning mechanisms concerning supply, demand and transit.  
 
Transit 
The aim is to define mechanisms to ensure reliable uninterrupted energy transit. The essential elements 
are: 
- Definition of principles for establishing reasonable, transparent, non-discriminatory, cost-based 
transit tariffs; 
- Unacceptability of unauthorized interruption or reduction of transit; 
- Mechanisms for coordination among parties in order to optimize transit routes; 
- Special bodies authorized to address emergency situations; 
- Dispute settlement by diplomatic means rather than by arbitration and international courts. 
 
Source: President Medvedev “Conceptual approach to the New legal Framework for Energy 




* * * 
The situation resulting from these two approaches is making it difficult for the parties to reach 
a new partnership agreement. The realism of satisfying mutual interests has thus prevailed and 
is structuring an “essentially bilateral dialogue”, either with gas companies or with individual 
states, while dialogue with the EU as an entity is hampered by different ideas about how the 
market and gas industry should be structured. Aside from the question of security, these 
differences are in fact the expression of a clash of values between the EU and Russia on the 
type of partnership that they should develop and more specifically on how much emphasis 
should be placed on the rule of law. The efficiency and effectiveness of certain market 
institutions are largely dependent on the institutional context in which they operate. The 
Russian state’s renewed control of the hydrocarbons industry, which has put the sector back 
on its feet and added fresh dynamism, may prove to be in total contradiction with the 
multilateralism and principles of competition promoted by the Energy Charter and the EU. 
The challenge now is no doubt to try to develop common approaches that can respond to the 
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